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Regional Grants: Are They Worth It? 
  
Colin Wren 
 
1: Introduction 
 
There has been much interest in regional economic issues in recent years.  This is not 
just because the disparities in UK regional economic performance have persisted (Adams et 
al, 2003), but because the performance of regions is seen as essential to achieving high and 
stable levels of national growth and employment (HM Treasury, 2001).1  Like its immediate 
predecessor, the Labour Government has sought to promote indigenous development, rather 
than to re-distribute existing economic activity between regions, but novel to its approach are 
institutional reforms that have sought to build-up capacity at the regional level to formulate 
and implement policy.2  Alongside these developments, aspects of the old regional policy 
remain, principally in the form of the discretionary grants to private industry available under 
the Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) scheme.  This scheme was introduced more than 
thirty years ago, but in one form or another grants have existed since the earliest interventions 
of the Depression, and they have been available continuously since the early 1960s (see Wren, 
1996a).  The grants are primarily about job creation (Armstrong 2001), but they sit uneasily 
with the new direction of regional policy, and they have recently come under much scrutiny, 
which has resulted in controversy about the value of the regional grants. 
 
The controversy over the grants has three aspects.   First and foremost, recent reports 
have questioned the usefulness of RSA as a job-creation measure.  The National Audit Office 
finds that over the period 1991-95, RSA created 21,000 jobs at an average cost of £21,000 
(NAO, 2003), while a background report puts it at only 6,000 jobs (NERA, 2003).  Clearly, it 
is a poor return on around £500 million in grant expenditure over the period.3   Second, since 
the mid-1980s, half the regional grants by value has gone to support foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  The grants seek to locate FDI in the designated Assisted Areas (see below), but the 
recent empirical evidence is not encouraging.  Studies find that the grants are ineffective and 
that agglomeration economies are much more important in determining location.  Finally, HM 
Treasury (2001) finds that productivity differentials account for about sixty per cent of the 
disparities in regional per capita GDP, and as such recent policy is focused on productivity as 
a source of competitiveness and economic growth (DTI, 1998).  However, on this score, the 
evidence is also weak.  Not only do RSA-assisted plants appear to have lower productivity, 
but in some studies the assisted plants have shorter survival time durations. 
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The purpose of the paper is to review the recent evidence on the effects and cost-
effectiveness of Regional Selective Assistance in order to draw conclusions for the future of 
UK regional policy.  UK Regional policy has many aspects, but RSA is the principal source 
of industrial financial assistance, and it is often taken as synonymous with regional policy.4   
The paper argues that RSA has beneficial effects, and not only is it more cost-effective than is 
suggested by recent studies, but it is at least as cost-effective as other measures, so that ways 
of expanding the grant scheme are considered.  In the next section, expenditure on the grants 
is described, and the early evidence on cost-effectiveness is reviewed.  Changes to regional 
policy in response to this, and the nature of the RSA scheme are then described.  Section 3 
reviews the methodology used to evaluate regional policy, and in Section 4 the empirical 
evidence is examined on the effects of RSA on employment, FDI location and productivity.  
Section 5 considers the employment cost-effectiveness of RSA, its scale, and the implications 
of this for policy.  Conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
 
2: The Quest for Cost-Effectiveness 
 
2.1 The Pattern of Expenditure 
 
Expenditure on UK regional industrial assistance between 1960 and 2002 is shown in 
Figure 1, with a three-fold breakdown of the assistance.5  It is taken from Wren (1996b), but 
extended forward in time.  It shows spending on all forms of regional industrial assistance to 
private industry, including grants, loans and investment tax allowances, all expressed as ‘grant 
equivalents’.  This is the grant amount that if received at the same time as the subsidy has 
equivalent value to the firm in net present value terms.  Where a similar national measure 
exists the differential subsidy in favour of the Assisted Areas is calculated.  For the case of a 
grant, discretionary assistance determines the grant rate as part of the grant-giving process, 
which is zero where assistance is refused, whereas automatic support offers the grant at a rate 
that is determined automatically according to the published eligibility criteria.  Discretionary 
assistance includes the Regional Selective Assistance scheme.  Unlike other categories, which 
support capital investment, the employment premiums directly subsidise labour. 
 
Figure 1 identifies £32 billion in regional policy assistance over 1960-2002, of which 
£18.8bn (59%) is in automatic investment support, £7.8bn (24%) is in employment premiums 
and £5.4bn (17%) is in discretionary assistance (1995 prices).  At its peak, regional policy 
assistance expenditure reached £2,200 million in 1975/76 (1995 prices), but it is now running 
at less than £200m per annum and it is set to fall further.  Regional assistance comprised only 
discretionary assistance in the early 1960s, but spending built-up from this time, first with the 
introduction of the automatic support and then with the employment premiums.   
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Automatic investment support: The 1963 Budget introduced regionally differentiated 
tax allowances for the first time.6  The allowances were replaced by the Investment Grants in 
1966, and in one form or another, the automatic investment support increased up to 1982, but 
with four dips in spending (see Figure 1).  First, the introduction of Corporation Tax in 1965 
diminished the real value of the allowances, leading to the introduction of Investment Grants 
to restore the real value of the subsidy.   Second, the Investment Grants were later viewed as 
expensive and in 1970 they were replaced by regionally differentiated first-year writing-down 
allowances, but which was reversed in 1972 by the introduction of the Regional Development 
Grant (RDG).  Third, spending fell in 1977 when the construction and mining activities were 
excluded from RDG to curb public expenditure.  Finally, investment support fell dramatically 
with the recession in 1979, due to a depressed level of investment and take-up. 
 
Employment premiums: The origin for these was the Selective Employment Tax in 
1966.  This surcharged employers’ National Insurance contributions to raise revenue for an 
expansion of public services, but it was refunded to those firms outside of the construction 
and service sectors to effect a structural change in the economy towards the industries with an 
export content.  In addition, a Selective Employment Premium (SEP) was paid to firms in 
these sectors, but this was withdrawn for firms outside of the Assisted Areas in the 1967 
devaluation.  It coincided with the introduction of a Regional Employment Premium (REP), 
which was also payable at fixed amounts in respect of those employees eligible for SEP.  The 
combined subsidy was put at about 8 per cent of wages (McCrone, 1969), but in real terms 
expenditure on the premiums decreased in every year after their introduction, so that the rates 
were doubled in 1974 to restore their value.  The premiums were cut in the first sterling crisis 
of 1976, and withdrawn altogether in the public expenditure cuts of December 1976. 
 
Discretionary assistance: Regional policy expenditure peaked in 1976, but the turning 
point was the early 1980s, since when discretionary assistance has taken an increased share of 
expenditure.  Revisions at this time included a phased reduction in the geographical coverage 
of the Assisted Areas, a reduction in the RDG grant rate and a four-month deferral on RDG 
payments, with RDG effectively scrapped in 1984.7  Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) 
was introduced in 1972, at the same time as RDG, and made on a discretionary basis towards 
projects backed by capital investment that either created or retained jobs.  In 2000, smaller 
projects became ineligible for RSA, and these are now funded under an Enterprise Grant 
Scheme, which is available to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) both inside and 
outside the regional policy areas.  Annual expenditure on RSA is about £200m per annum in 
Great Britain, with a further £12m on the Enterprise Grant Scheme in England, but, as we see, 
spending is set to fall substantially. 
 4
2.2 Early Evidence on Employment Cost-Effectiveness 
 
The objectives of UK regional policy have been couched in many ways over the years, 
but ultimately it has been judged in terms of its ability to create jobs.  This is the thrust of all 
Government evaluations, and it was a factor underlying the above revisions.  Employment 
cost-effectiveness was an important concern in early regional policy efforts.  The 1960 Local 
Employment Act required the Board of Trade to pay attention to “the relationship between the 
expenditure involved and the employment likely to be provided”, and Treasury approval was 
required for cases where the ‘grant per job’ exceeded £1,000 (about £10,000 at today’s 
prices).  However, the job link was dropped when the Investment Grants were introduced in 
1966, and it was only reintroduced when the RDG scheme was scrapped in the mid-1980s, so 
that throughout most of its operation there was no direct job-creation link, even though it was 
the criterion on which the policy was to be judged.  A 1983 White Paper put the ‘cost’ of a 
regional policy ‘job’ at £35,000 (DTI, 1983), which at today’s prices can be roughly doubled.  
This was undoubtedly a major factor for the changes to UK regional policy in the early 1980s, 
and it gave the policy a poor reputation.  However, there are reasons why this is misleading, 
and why it is no longer relevant to the current regional policy.   
 
First of all, Table 1 re-produces estimates for the employment effect of UK regional 
policy over 1966-76.  They are calculated by Moore et al (1986), by applying a shift-share 
analysis to regional employment data of the 1950s to determine the counter-factual position.  
They are the basis for the estimate given in the earlier 1983 White Paper.  Table 1 shows that 
regional policy created 210,000 jobs over 1966-76 at a ‘cost per job’ of £47,750.  However, it 
also shows that much of the support was taken-up by firms in capital-intensive industries, 
which created few jobs.8   The ‘cost per job’ in these firms was put at £786,000, so that the 
pattern of take-up was a major factor in the poor employment effect of the grants.  Second, 
outside of the capital-intensive industries, Table 1 suggests that the policy was still relatively 
expensive, at a ‘cost’ of £26,000 per ‘job’.  However, this is because the shift-share approach 
gives an unfavourable measure of the jobs.  It is based on all those jobs created over 1966-76, 
but still existing at 1976, so that it ignores those jobs that were created by policy but lost by 
1976.  Firm-based estimates that measure the job effect over shorter periods give much lower 
estimates.  In Wren (1994), for example, the ‘three-year cost per job’ for regional incentives is 
£10,000 for large firms, and at about half this for smaller firms (1985 prices).   
 
The kind of evidence produced by the 1983 White Paper led to the shift away from 
automatic assistance to a discretionary policy.  Discretionary assistance has a number of 
potential advantages, each to do with asymmetric information (see Wren, 2003b).  The first is 
that it gives the Government the chance to scrutinise projects, and to vary the terms of the 
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assistance in the light of the information gained about the job creation prospects of a project, 
so that it helps mitigate adverse selection.  Second, it allows the Government to scrutinise a 
firm’s commitment to carry out a project as agreed, and not to subsequently vary the terms of 
the contract, which is a moral hazard problem.  Finally, it gives the Government an advantage 
where bargaining over the grant rate is likely (e.g. where the number of projects is small or if 
they are large in scale), as its threat point is to refuse a grant, which increases its bargaining 
hand.  However, discretionary assistance involves scrutinising projects in order to elicit the 
information about the nature of projects, which imposes administration and compliance costs 
on the Government and the firms.  It can lead to errors, of which there are two types: 
 
Type I:  The Government may in error offer too low a grant rate or refuse a grant to a 
project that requires assistance to proceed. 
Type II: The Government may in error offer too high a grant to a project that would 
proceed with a lower grant or no grant at all. 
 
The errors may either waste public resources (a Type II error) or reduce the number of 
projects implemented (a Type I error), and by implication they lead to a reduction in welfare.  
In the case of a Type II error (at least some of) the assistance has no effect on firm behaviour, 
but the resources involved lead to efficiency losses elsewhere in the economy, e.g. from the 
excess burden of higher taxation.  A Type I error arises because there are welfare-improving 
projects that fail to be implemented because the assistance is insufficient.  It implies market 
failure, although other rationales exist for public support, such as distributional reasons (HM 
Treasury, 2003b), to which the discussion returns below.9   In either case, an error leads to a 
socially inefficient outcome compared to that which is achievable in the first-best position. 
 
Overall, the move to discretionary grants in the form of Regional Selective Assistance 
offers up the prospect of a much more cost-effective job-creation scheme.  However, the cost 
of scrutiny and the possibility of errors raise the possibility of a less cost-effective scheme, so 
that this is largely an empirical matter.  Before considering the evidence for RSA, the nature 
of this scheme is considered.  This focuses on the eligibility criteria, which not only indicates 
the changing nature of RSA, but of UK regional policy itself. 
 
2.3 The Regional Selective Assistance Scheme 
 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) was introduced under the 1972 Industry Act, and 
it has taken an increased share of regional policy budget since the early 1980s.  Its advantage 
over automatic support is that it can be tied directly to job creation and refused to projects that 
do not fulfil ex ante grant-per-job conditions (see Swales, 1997a).  To satisfy European Union 
(EU) regulations on state aids projects must also be supported by investment in fixed capital 
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(CEC, 1998).   In addition to the conditions on job creation and investment, RSA is associated 
with a number of other criteria that define the scheme eligibility.  These criteria have changed 
over time, and as well as seeking further improvements in cost-effectiveness, they have other 
motivations that include a reduction in expenditure by restricting take-up, greater efficiency in 
administration and the promotion of national as well as regional objectives. 
 
Initially, the guidelines for RSA placed qualifying projects into two categories: new 
projects and expansions that created additional employment (Category A); and projects that 
did not provide extra jobs but maintained or safeguarded existing employment (Category B).  
Assistance was related to the number of jobs, and it was given as a cheap loan, interest-relief 
grant or removal grant under Category A, but as a loan at commercial rates under Category B.  
In either case, the applicant had to demonstrate the viability of the firm and that the greater 
part of the project cost would be met from sources outside of the public sector.  In the case of 
Category B projects the assistance was only offered where it could not be reasonably obtained 
from other sources.  The bulk of assistance went to manufacturing firms under Category A, 
even though service firms that were not primarily serving a local market were eligible, and 
until 1984 could obtain extra assistance under related schemes. 
 
A review of industrial aid in July 1979 introduced two new criteria.  The first was a 
‘Proof of Need’ condition.   This required that RSA should lead to a significant change in the 
nature or scale of a project, a significant advance in timing or a desirable change in location.  
A similar condition had previously existed only for the Category B projects.  It reintroduced a 
condition under the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act that assistance could be provided only 
if the funds could not be obtained on requisite terms from elsewhere.10  It was dropped by the 
1960 Local Employment Act, but it later applied to virtually every area of industrial support.   
Second, a ‘Regional and National Benefit’ condition was introduced.  This required that the 
project should strengthen the regional and national economy, providing more ‘productive and 
secure jobs’, such as through improved operating efficiency.  As part of this the issue of job 
displacement was taken into account in disbursing the grants.  To cut down on administration 
costs, loans were given only in exceptional circumstances, so that after 1980 assistance was in 
the form of a project grant related to the fixed and working capital of a project, as well as the 
number of jobs.  A further change was made to RSA at the time that RDG was abolished in 
1984, when it was no longer payable to relocation projects where there was no net increase in 
jobs to the UK as a whole.  It represented a major change in the orientation of regional policy, 
which since the War had been about encouraging plants to locate in the regions.  Finally, to 
address moral hazard, a ‘claw-back’ clause was introduced into the assistance contract under 
which the grant was repayable over a five-year period if the job target was not achieved.11 
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RSA remained broadly unchanged until the year 2000, and the current set of criteria is 
shown in Table 2.  The first five criteria are essentially the same as before, with the ‘Prior 
Commitment’ condition essentially beefing-up the Proof of Need.12  The other two eligibility 
criteria are new developments.   In the case of the ‘Quality’ condition, a 1998 White Paper on 
competitiveness (DTI, 1998) focused RSA on ‘high-quality knowledge-based’ projects to 
improve regional competitiveness.  This was at the height of the ‘New Economy’, so there are 
doubts about whether there are sufficient of these projects in the regions (Regional Studies 
Association, 2001).  Project quality is judged by wages relative to the sector and region, the 
sustainability of employment and the levels of R&D and training (DTI, 2001).  
 
The other new condition introduced in 2000 concerns the ‘Eligible Investment’, and it 
means that RSA is now only available to projects where the capital expenditure exceeds 
£500,000.   For other projects an Enterprise Grant Scheme (EGS) was introduced.  This is also 
a discretionary scheme for projects with up to £500,000 in capital investment, but available to 
SMEs only.13   The EGS operates in Enterprise Grant Areas, which include the Assisted Areas 
(Tier 1 and 2 areas), but Tier 3 areas outside the Assisted Areas designated to include areas 
with particular social problems.14   It offers a capital grant up to a rate of 15% and a maximum 
award of £75,000 (hence for capital investments up to £500,000), but at a reduced rate of 
7.5% for medium-sized firms in Tier 3 areas.  RSA is available in the Assisted Areas, at grant 
rates up to 35 per cent in Tier 1 areas and up to 20 per cent in Tier 2 areas, but the minimum 
RSA grant amount is £75,000.  The changes mean that projects up to £500,000 implemented 
by large firms in the Assisted Areas are no longer eligible for assistance. 
 
 Unlike RSA, EGS does not make it essential for a project to create jobs, and it differs 
in a number of other respects.  Initially, EGS was administered by the Government Regional 
Offices, but it has since been transferred to the Small Business Service in each region, which 
is required to consult with the Regional Development Agency to decide on any additional 
scheme criteria to reflect local priorities.  However, spending on the scheme is small at only 
about £12 million per annum.  In the first year after the introduction of EGS the number of 
applications for RSA in England fell by three-quarters, indicating that expenditure on the 
regional grants is set to fall much further.  Thus, while £103m was spent on RSA and EGS in 
England in 2002/03 compared with £112m on RSA in 2000/01, the value of offers has fallen 
from £205m for RSA in 2000/01 to £123m for the combined schemes in 2002/03.15
 
3: The Evaluation Methodology 
 
Regional policy evaluation is contentious (see McVittie and Swales, 2003), so that 
before proceeding to consider the results of these evaluations, it is worth briefly exploring the 
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RSA evaluation methodology.   In general, three issues underlie policy evaluation: the first is 
to decide what policy effects to include; the second is the measurement of the effects; and the 
final issue is the choice of the appraisal technique.  These issues are not independent, but they 
are now considered in turn in order to highlight the nature and difficulties involved in regional 
policy evaluation.  The evaluation methodology changed in the mid-1980s (see Taylor, 2002), 
but related to the second of these issues, i.e. the measurement of the policy effect. 
 
Policy effects: While there is perhaps inevitable vagueness about the stated aim of UK 
regional policy, which can frustrate evaluation (McVittie and Swales, 2003), it is clear that 
RSA is mainly about job creation.  It aims to encourage “sound projects, which will improve 
employment opportunities in the Assisted Areas” (HC 852, 2003), and the evaluations have 
focused on its employment effect.  Hence, the issues are to decide what jobs to include (e.g. 
indirect jobs) and the level of disaggregation by job type or employee (see Marquand, 1980; 
Swales, 1997a).16   In general, RSA evaluations measure the total number of jobs, giving 
these an equal weight.  There is no attempt to value the jobs, whether at market or shadow 
prices, and no attempt to apply distributional weights to different types of job, except that the 
jobs outside the Assisted Areas are given a zero weight.  This approach is disputed (e.g. 
Swales, 1997b), but it can be defended, as distributional weights are controversial, while 
according to the ‘decision-making approach’ the social weights can be imputed directly from 
the stated aim of policy (Sugden and Williams, 1978).   In the case of RSA, the broad aim is 
job creation in the Assisted Areas, and it is reasonable that the evaluations should focus on 
this.  
 
Measurement: Once it has been decided what policy effects to include the issue is how 
to measure these.  It reduces to determining the counter-factual or ‘without-policy’ position.  
Early regional policy evaluations used macro-evaluation techniques to determine this (Bartels 
et al, 1982), but difficulties with these techniques and both the smaller scale and geographical 
coverage of regional policy mean that recent RSA evaluations are based on what Gillespie et 
al (2001) describe as the ‘industrial survey’ technique.  This is a micro-based approach that 
relies on the managers’ own subjective assessments of the counter-factual.  It is much used by 
Government in evaluating a range of policies, and it has the advantage of giving information 
on the process underlying the operation of policy.  However, it is subject to a large number of 
potential biases, which limits its appeal.17  These are sampling bias (it is non-experimental), 
hypothetical bias (it is concerned with a counter-factual), starting-point bias (framing effects 
in questionnaire design may condition the response), information bias (events are rationalised 
ex post) and strategic bias (respondents respond to ensure scheme continuity). 
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Appraisal technique: Finally, it is necessary to decide on the appropriate technique in 
order to determine whether the policy is worthwhile or not.  There are different views on this, 
but if a policy has a single over-riding objective and the resources are constrained then Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) is an appropriate appraisal technique (Jones-Lee, 1994).  CEA 
provides a comparative measure of scheme performance, as it tells the policymaker where to 
allocate funds between competing policies.  Ideally, it should be carried out at the margin, but 
in practice it is calculated as the ratio of the total policy effect to its resource cost, so that in 
employment policy it leads naturally to the ‘cost per job’.  CEA is the method used in regional 
policy evaluation, whether conducted at the macro or micro-level, although other methods are 
proposed.  Swales (1997b) argues for a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) on the grounds that it 
offers better guidance and the jobs are heterogeneous.18   However, if job type is not an issue, 
then CEA gives a framework for making resource allocation decisions, provided the costs and 
the jobs are correctly measured.  NERA (2003) argue for an appraisal based on contingent 
valuation, but this technique is usually applied when valuing non-market effects, whereas in 
the case of regional policy the jobs can be valued using the appropriate wage rate. 
 
The recent empirical evidence on the effects of Regional Selective Assistance is now 
considered.  The purpose of this is to address the controversies outlined in the Introduction, in 
relation to its effect on employment, FDI location and productivity.  Of course, RSA is about 
job creation, and this is the focus in Section 5 where the cost-effectiveness and scale of policy 
are considered.  The employment results are taken from the Government evaluations, which 
use the industrial survey technique, based on structured interviews with senior personnel of 
randomly drawn samples of assisted firms.  As such, they are subject to the criticisms outlined 
above.  However, over the last twenty years they are the only systematic attempt to measure 
the employment effect of RSA for England and for Great Britain as a whole. 
 
4: The Effects of Regional Selective Assistance 
 
Regional Selective Assistance is one of the UK’s longest-running industrial support 
schemes, and it is perhaps the most heavily evaluated scheme, with the Government carrying 
out evaluations for the periods 1980-84 (King, 1990), 1985-88 (PACEC, 1993) and 1991-95 
(AEP, 2000).  The evaluations focus on measuring the direct employment effect, which is 
adjusted for displacement, linkage and multiplier effects.  To find the counter-factual position 
the evaluations concentrate on the project ‘additionality’, which is the extent to which RSA 
alters the firm’s investment decision, whether in timing, scale or location.  It is a test of the ex 
ante scrutiny of projects and it reveals information about the Type II errors outlined in Section 
2.2.  In particular, AEP (2000) find that “53% of projects would have been able to go ahead at 
the same scale with a lower grant amount” (para 5.5), so that a Type II error occurs in half the 
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projects.  Since non-assisted firms are not surveyed, the extent of the Type I errors is not 
known.  It reflects the narrow concern of the Government evaluations with the proper use of 
public funds in existing schemes, so that the optimal policy scale is not an issue. 
 
The results on ‘additionality’ from the three evaluations are summarised in Table 3, 
for which there is a total of 526 observations.  A similar pattern of results is obtained across 
the three evaluations.  Of the Type II errors, 18.5 per cent of projects would have gone ahead 
in exactly the same form without the assistance, but in the remainder of cases RSA has some 
effect, or ‘additionality’.19  Table 3 shows that 21 per cent of projects would have been 
abandoned altogether, and that the other sixty per cent of projects were altered in some way, 
whether in timing, scale or location.   Of those changed in timing, the grant may have brought 
a project forward only by a year or two, while there is no information on the amount by which 
projects were changed in scale.  In the case of projects changed in location, these are likely to 
be foreign investors, as RSA was not available to relocations within the UK.  
  
4.1 The Employment Effect 
 
In the case of the most recent RSA evaluation, AEP (2000) find that it created 84,000 
jobs over 1991-95.   However, drawing on the results of this study, the National Audit Office 
finds that it created 21,000 jobs (NAO, 2003), and a background report prepared by NERA 
(2003) argues that it is less than 6,000 jobs.  On these different views, regional policy either is 
a strong, moderate or a weak job-creation measure, so that the issue needs to be explored.  
The estimates of AEP (2000) are reproduced in Table 4 for Great Britain and England.  The 
table also gives ‘cost per job’ estimates, which are discussed in Section 5. 
  
The 3,845 RSA-assisted projects implemented in Great Britain between January 1991 
and June 1995 are associated with 210,000 gross jobs (see Table 4).  This is arrived at by 
scaling-up the survey results from a stratified sample of 165 RSA recipients.  Adjustments are 
then made to this figure for ‘additionality’; the displacement of jobs elsewhere in the Assisted 
Areas; and for multiplier and linkage effects in supplier firms.   Combined they give a figure 
for the Net Jobs Created of 84,000 jobs (see Table 4).  A further adjustment is made because 
the jobs occur in different time periods and they have different lifetimes, so that the jobs are 
expressed in present value terms using the Treasury discount rate.  Table 3 shows that about a 
quarter of projects are brought forward through time by RSA, but otherwise it is assumed that 
the jobs have a lifetime equal to that of the asset provided by the project, which on average is 
ten years.  Once discounted, the results are given as two alternative measures of the job effect: 
a Present Value Net Job Year (PJY), which is a job year, and a Permanent Net Job Equivalent 
(PJE), which is a job lifetime.  A job that lasts for 10 years is equal to 7.4 PJYs, and a job that 
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lasts forever is equal to 16.7 PJYs or 1 PJE.  Table 4 shows that the 84,000 Net Jobs Created 
in Great Britain are equal to 652,000 PJYs or 39,000 (= 652,000 / 16.7) PJEs. 
 
 The controversy over the size of the regional policy employment effect arises for two 
reasons.  First, it arises from differences over the appropriate measure of the jobs, and second 
from disagreements over the value of the industrial survey approach.  On the first of these, 
Table 4 shows that the reason that the National Audit Office produces such a small effect of 
21,000 jobs is that not only because they report the jobs for England, but they express these as 
Permanent Net Job Equivalents.  Discounting of monetary sums that occur in different time 
periods is common, but the discounting of the jobs is more contentious.  According to Swales 
(1997a), the HM Treasury Green Book on Appraisal and Evaluation finds that there is no 
agreement on the issue, although the latest Green Book argues that all the benefits and costs 
should be discounted (HM Treasury, 2003b).  Of greater practical significance is that virtually 
no other study of a job-creation scheme uses this measure of the jobs, and this undermines the 
purpose of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, which is to provide a comparative measure of scheme 
performance.  Since most other studies examine the ‘cost per job created’, and this is the way 
in which measures of the employment cost-effectiveness are commonly used and understood, 
then it seems better to express the employment effect in terms of Net Jobs Created. 
  
 The second area of controversy surrounds the use of the industrial survey approach.   
NERA (2003) take the employment estimate of RSA for England from AEP (2000), but citing 
evidence in Gillespie et al (2001) and Wren (1994) they reduce this for three reasons: 
 
i. ‘Additionality’ is over-estimated by the survey approach because of strategic bias; 
ii. Real wages will adjust upwards in response to regional grants, displacing jobs; and 
iii. Assisted jobs last less than ten years on average. 
 
Their conclusion is that “a more accurate net number of jobs created in England might 
be no more than 5-6,000 permanent job equivalents” (NERA, 2003, p. 36).20   This expresses 
the jobs as PJEs, but if given in terms of Net Jobs Created then applying their adjustments it is 
27,350 jobs.21  This is about one-third of the 84,000 Net Jobs Created found by AEP (2000), 
so how are the criticisms of NERA and the regional policy employment effect to be judged? 
 
 On the first point, NERA seem to make a valid observation.  Generally, the biases of 
the survey approach that were identified above could work in either direction, but in the case 
of strategic bias the latest RSA evaluation finds that “some companies have come to realise 
that RSA will be assessed largely on the grounds of additionality and that the best way they 
can help secure its continuation is to claim maximum additionality” (AEP, 2000, para 7.2.2).  
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From an analysis of RSA grant offers NERA find that only 12 per cent of recipients received 
further RSA, but representing 30 per cent of the total offers, so that repeat awards seem to be 
a problem.  On the second point, Gillespie et al note that the Government evaluations suppose 
a Keynesian labour market with excess labour supply but nominal wage rigidity.  They argue 
that it is inconsistent with both the Treasury view and recent empirical work, which makes the 
regional wage rate depend on the regional rather than the national unemployment rate.  If the 
regional labour market is flexible, the policy-induced jobs will increase the regional wage and 
crowd-out employment.  Gillespie et al (2001) find that this reduces the employment effect by 
about half, although the exact effect depends crucially on the parameterization of the regional 
labour market.   Finally, on the third point, the ‘job life’ refers to the length of time that a job 
is attributable to assistance, and not the period over which a job lasts, which is longer.  While 
a ‘job life’ of ten years seems excessive (Wren, 1994), it is relevant to the evaluations because 
the job effect is expressed as Permanent Net Job Equivalents.  If the employment effect is 
expressed in terms of Net Jobs Created then the ‘job life’ is not an issue.   
 
Overall, the measurement of the regional policy effect is controversial.  If expressed in 
terms of Net Jobs Created for Great Britain the Government-sponsored evaluation reports a 
figure of 84,000 jobs over 1991-95, but if the criticisms of NERA are fully taken on-board it 
could be as little as 27,350 jobs.  This suggests that the RSA employment effect per annum is 
in the range 6,100 to 18,700 jobs created.  Where the true effect lies depends on the strength 
of the first two criticisms of NERA outlined above.  While there is validity in the argument 
for strategic bias (the adjustment is a multiplicand of 0.74), the adjustment for flexible labour 
markets (of 0.44) is probably overdone.  This is because displacement effects are taken into 
account when disbursing RSA, while much of the assistance has gone to support FDI, which 
tends to be in newer industries not previously present in the Assisted Areas.  Any crowding-
out of employment is therefore likely to be through a general wage effect, but compared with 
the scale of the regional unemployment problem the number of jobs created by the policy is 
not substantial (see below).   Thus, it is reasonable that the employment effect lies somewhere 
towards the middle of this range, say at around 12,000 Net Jobs Created per year.  It is much 
more than is apparent from the NERA study, at about 1,000 jobs a year, but which expresses 
the jobs in terms of Permanent Net Job Equivalents. 
 
4.2 The Effect on FDI Location 
 
The importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the RSA scheme increased in the 
mid-1980s, and Figure 2 shows its share over 1990-2003.  It reveals that FDI accounts for 
only about one-tenth of RSA offers (twenty per cent of offers since the revisions to RSA in 
2000), but fifty per cent of the assistance.  In some years, as much as eighty per cent of RSA-
 13
supported investment is in the form of FDI.   Thus, while the regional grants are not available 
for relocations in the UK, they have been used extensively to support inward FDI.  Recent 
studies focus on the spillover effects of FDI on indigenous plants, with Haskel et al (2002), 
for example, finding a UK domestic productivity benefit from FDI that in present value terms 
is valued at around £2,500 per FDI job.  However, before this can be attributed to RSA, we 
need to know what the evidence is for the effect of the grants on industrial location. 
  
Prior to the 1980s a major aim of regional policy was to encourage firms to relocate 
within the UK to the Assisted Areas, and the evidence on this experience suggests that it was 
successful.  Ashcroft and Taylor (1979) find that policy caused 500 establishments to relocate 
over the 1960s, raising the employment of the Assisted Areas by 100,000 jobs. The period 
was associated with both investment incentives and location controls, but the evidence is that 
these were about as equally effective as one another (see Taylor, 2002).  The survey results 
reported in Table 3 suggest that RSA changed the project location in around a fifth of cases, 
with most firms reporting that the project would otherwise have located outside the UK.  The 
Government evaluations do not give a breakdown of this by the country of origin, but a 
disaggregation of ‘additionality’ by project scale is given in Figure 3, which shows that the 
projects that were changed in location were almost exclusively the larger projects.  Thus, half 
of the projects greater than £1 million reported that RSA changed their location.  In fact, these 
larger RSA-assisted plants are substantially more likely to be foreign-owned, so that the 
survey-based evidence is that the grants are effective in attracting FDI.22
 
Early econometric evidence on the effect of the regional grants on FDI location at the 
regional level is also encouraging (e.g. Hill and Munday, 1992).   However, a difficulty with 
these studies is that more FDI is associated with more grant, so that there is an endogeneity 
problem.  Recent studies allow for this, but the evidence is that the grants are rather poor, with 
agglomeration effects dominating the firm’s location choice.  Devereux et al (2003) examine 
the location of new plants in the counties of Great Britain over 1986-92, and make the RSA 
term exogenous by predicting the grant amount that a plant could get in each location.  Their 
results show that other things equal the Assisted Areas are a less attractive location, but that a 
grant has a significant effect on location.  However, the effect of this is extremely small, so 
that a one per cent increase in the grant increases the probability of location by only between 
0.04 - 0.13 of one per cent, which when calculated at the mean implies a £100,000 increase in 
RSA increases in the probability of location in an area by only 0.0001!   Devereux et al find 
that FDI tends to locate near to other foreign-owned plants in the same industry.   
 
The results of Devereux et al concur with other econometric studies.  For example, 
Crozet et al (2004) find little evidence of the effect of EU or national regional policies on the 
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location choices of foreign multinationals in France.  Similarly, Holmes (1998) finds no effect 
for pro-business policies at the US state level for plants locating close to the state borders. 
Taylor (1993) examines Japanese manufacturing investment in the UK over 1984-91, when 
the number of these establishments increased from 40 to 219.  Even with agglomeration terms 
he finds a significant effect on location of regional policy (i.e. the designation of an area for 
regional policy).  A similar result is found by Head et al (1995) in their study of Japanese 
investment across US states.  A possibility is that the grants are important for early-stage 
investment, but that agglomeration factors are more important later on.   However, the weak 
effect found for the grants in the econometric studies could be because they are carried out for 
individual nations, examining plant location between one part of a country and another.  The 
survey evidence on ‘additionality’ is that the grants determine location at the international 
level, and indeed RSA is not offered for relocations within the UK.  As such, the econometric 
evidence need not contradict the survey evidence that the grants are very effective in changing 
plant location, but at a national level rather than at a regional level. 
 
4.3 The Effect on Productivity and Competitiveness 
 
Econometric techniques have recently been used to examine the effect of RSA on total 
factor productivity and competitiveness.  This is of interest because the Government reports 
that productivity accounts for sixty per cent of the disparities in regional GDP per capita (HM 
Treasury, 2001), while in 1998 the Government undertook to refocus RSA on ‘high-quality 
knowledge-based’ projects to improve competitiveness (DTI, 1998).  Harris and Robinson 
(2003) examine total factor productivity at the plant level, including two dummy variables for 
RSA.  The first takes a value of unity if the plant is at any time assisted by RSA over 1990-98, 
and the second has a value of unity for all the years after the receipt of RSA.  When estimated 
for Assisted and Non-Assisted Areas both terms are significant, but the first is negative and 
the second is positive, indicating that RSA-assisted plants have productivity that is 4.7 per 
cent lower than other plants, but that RSA improves this by 2.5 per cent.  The result that RSA-
assisted plants are poorer than other plants need not be alarming, as policy should operate at 
the margin where it potentially has the greatest effect, and this may be in lower productivity 
plants.  However, of greater concern is that when regressed for the Assisted Areas only, the 
second RSA dummy-variable term is generally insignificant, suggesting that that it may be 
picking-up a regional effect, so that there is some ambiguity regarding the result. 
 
Competitiveness is an ill-defined concept, but the evidence is that employees in RSA-
assisted firms are less well paid than those nationally (AEP, 2000), although it might reflect 
regional wage differences.  Three-quarters of firms report a competitive advantage as a result 
of RSA from lower costs or better-quality products, but the former could just be because RSA 
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gives a profitability support.  The effects are not quantified, and more convincing evidence is 
provided by another study by Harris and Robinson (2004).  They find that despite their lower 
productivity, plants in receipt of RSA generally experience growth in market share and have a 
higher probability of survival, indicating an increase in competitiveness.  Harris and Robinson 
point to a possible conflict between job creation and competitiveness, as closure (and entry) is 
found to be important in raising an economy’ productivity.  In the case of large foreign-owned 
start-up plants, Jones and Wren (2003) find that plants receiving RSA have shorter survival 
durations.   Overall, the studies suggest RSA has positive impacts in addition to employment, 
but that its ability to raise productivity may be hindered by its focus on job creation. 
 
5: The Current Regional Policy 
 
 Overall, the above evidence is that RSA has performed well.  The survey results find 
that ‘additionality’ is achieved in eighty per cent of projects and there is an absence of a Type 
II in half the projects.  Further, it seems to have a major effect on locating large FDI projects, 
albeit at the international level, while there is evidence that it has other beneficial effects, such 
as on competitiveness.  It indicates that the shift to discretionary assistance and the revisions 
to RSA have met the concerns of policymakers regarding the employment cost-effectiveness 
of policy.   However, recent reports have cast doubt on this, putting the ‘cost’ of an RSA ‘job’ 
as high as £50,000.  Further, the revisions to regional policy may have been achieved at the 
cost of substantial Type I errors, which are ignored in the Government evaluations, but which 
could result in a sub-optimal policy scale.  These issues now considered. 
 
 5.1 The Cost-Effectiveness of Policy 
 
 The National Audit Office (NAO, 2003) gives a headline figure for the employment 
cost-effectiveness of regional policy of £21,000 per job, while NERA (2003) put it at around 
£50,000 per job.  Both studies measure the cost in net present value terms by deducting the 
future flow-backs to the Treasury from higher corporate tax revenues, so that the difference 
reflects the measurement of the employment effect.  Table 4 presents ‘cost per job’ estimates 
for the different job measures.  Since the employment effect for England is calculated pro-rata 
to the distribution of grants in Great Britain as a whole, the estimates are identical between 
these areas.  Table 4 presents the estimates from AEP (2000), and gives the estimates implied 
by the NERA study, by making adjustments for strategic bias and flexible labour markets.  
The NAO and NERA ‘costs per job’ reported above both express the jobs as Permanent Net 
Job Equivalents, except that the National Audit Office report the figure for £17,500 in Table 4 
at 2002 prices.23  When the jobs are given as Net Jobs Created, Table 4 shows the ‘cost per 
job’ is in the range £8,150 to £25,000 (1995 prices), corresponding to 18,700 and 6,100 jobs 
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Net Jobs Created a year.  However, it was argued that the true employment effect is around 
12,000 Net Jobs Created a year (see Section 4.1), in which case the ‘cost per job’ is around 
£12,700 (1995 prices), so how is this to be judged?   
 
There are several ways to make comparison.  One is with other job-creation schemes 
and another is with benefit payments paid to the unemployed, but in so doing the jobs must be 
appropriately measured.  On the first of these, in a back-of-the-envelope calculation, Layard 
(2001) calculates the short-run average cost of a person in employment from the New Deal at 
£7,000 in gross spending terms.24  It can be compared with the ‘cost per Net Job Created’ of 
£12,700.  However, the estimate for the New Deal makes a deduction from the costs for both 
benefit and tax savings, whereas the RSA figure makes a deduction for corporate tax savings 
only.  If deductions are not made for these, the ‘cost per job’ for the New Deal is £14,000, and 
this is in the same ballpark as that for RSA.  The second comparison can be made with the 
annual Jobseeker’s Allowance paid to an unemployed person aged 25 years.  This is around 
£3,000, but it is a recurrent payment, so comparison should be made with the ‘cost per Present 
Value Net Job Year’. Table 4 shows that it is between £1,050 and £3,250, but when calculated 
at the mid-point number of jobs it is about £1,600 (1995 prices).25  Again, this makes no 
allowance for the front-end costs of the scheme, but overall it suggests that RSA is at least as 
cost-effective as other measures designed to reduce or alleviate unemployment.  It is also far 
more cost-effective than earlier regional policy efforts in simple Exchequer terms. 
 
 5.2 The Optimal Policy Scale 
 
According to the evaluations the number of Net Jobs Created by RSA over 1991-95 is 
between 6,100 and 18,700 jobs per annum, and it is reckoned to be around 12,000 jobs a year. 
‘Acute labour market need’ features in the designation of the Assisted Areas, so that one way 
to judge whether the policy scale is optimal or not is to compare the employment effect to the 
size of the unemployment problem. Another way is to examine the contribution of RSA to the 
reduction in unemployment over recent years.  On the first of these, the combined claimant-
count unemployment in Scotland, Wales and the three northern-most English regions is about 
half a million.  Not all of these areas are designated for regional grants, and other areas are 
designated as Assisted Areas, while regional policy is not expected to completely eliminate 
regional unemployment. Nevertheless, the regional policy effect is small relative to the size of 
the unemployment problem, and it could only make a substantial reduction over the very-long 
term.  Moreover, it excludes those not claiming benefit or claiming other forms of support. 
 
On the second measure, NERA (2003) report that unemployment fell by 154,000 over 
1996-2002 in the English travel-to-work areas with unemployment rates more than 2 per cent 
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above the national average.   If RSA continued to create jobs at the same rate as over 1991-95, 
then in England it created around 40,000 jobs over 1996-02.26  Again, it suggests regional 
policy has made only a modest contribution to the regional unemployment problem.  Further, 
not every job created will last throughout the period and not every job created will reduce 
unemployment.27    Finally, Figure 4 shows that regional assistance expenditure over 1994-96 
in the EU Objective 1 areas, corresponding to the Tier 1 Assisted Areas in Great Britain.  It 
expresses assistance as an annual average relative to the GDP of each area, showing national 
state aid separately from that provided under the EU Structural Funds.  While other parts of 
the EU may not necessarily have optimal grant levels, Figure 4 reveals that UK spending on 
regional grants is less than a quarter of the EU average, and much smaller than in countries 
such as France or Germany.   There is a similar pattern for the EU Structural Funds. 
 
5.3 Policy Implications 
 
Overall, RSA appears relatively cost-effective, but its size in relation to the scale of 
regional unemployment is modest, while expenditure on the grants is set to fall and may halve 
over the near future.  It raises the possibility that the improvements to cost-effectiveness have 
been achieved at the cost of a smaller policy by excluding those projects where job creation is 
relatively expensive.  This implies a trade-off between the ‘cost per job’ and the policy scale, 
although whether this has occurred cannot be ascertained from the Government evaluations as 
they collect information only on the assisted projects.  Thus, it is not known how far the shift 
to discretionary assistance in an effort to avoid the Type II errors has caused more Type I 
errors, reducing the overall employment effect.28  Further, it is not known if the more 
stringent eligibility criteria on RSA have discouraged applicants.  Nevertheless, the suspicion 
is that the greater cost-effectiveness has been achieved at the cost of a much smaller scale, so 
that before concluding possible ways of expanding the regional grant scheme are considered.  
This differs from Taylor and Wren (1997) and Taylor (2002) where ways to expand regional 
policy more broadly are considered.    
 
As a first point, the scope for Government action in this area is restricted by European 
Commission guidelines on state aids.  Article 87 of the European Treaty makes aid unlawful 
if it distorts or threatens to distort competition or impacts on trade between Member States, 
and Guidelines and Frameworks are published setting out the types and levels of support that 
the Commission is prepared to approve.  In addition, reviews of state aids and EU regional 
policy (under which the Assisted Areas are defined) are on-going for the period 2007-13 (see 
HM Treasury, 2003a, 2004), which may further impact on the availability of regional grants.  
However, even within the existing framework the Commission exerts a considerable influence 
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on the grants, limiting the scope for Government action.  This must be taken into account in 
any discussion of the possibility of expanding the regional grant scheme. 
 
One problem with RSA is that it is demand-led, which not only means the take-up 
reflects the existing pattern of job-creating investment, but it leads to a large number of repeat 
awards referred to above.  The Commission disallows the promotion of state aids, so that to 
encourage a greater take-up of RSA changes must be made to the scheme itself.  One way to 
do this is to reverse the more-recently introduced criteria concerning Eligible Investment and 
Quality (Table 2), although this will merely restore the status quo before the most recent cuts 
take effect.  Another way is to offer higher grant rates to encourage more marginal projects.29  
However, perhaps the most fruitful way to expand the grants is to reintroduce a diversionary 
component to regional policy either by encouraging firms to relocate to the Assisted Areas or 
by supporting projects that displace activity elsewhere.  In Section 4.2 it was noted that this 
was how the policy operated prior to the 1980s and with success.  RSA has not been available 
to projects that simply relocate jobs to the Assisted Areas since 1984, as these projects have 
no ‘National Benefit’, even though it can be argued that this is what regional policy seeks to 
do in the case of FDI.   It would involve placing a higher value on jobs that are created in the 
Assisted Areas than elsewhere, and it need not run counter to the Guidelines on state aids.30  
This is because Besley and Seabright (1999) find that the Commission approves 98 per cent 
of the applications for state aid, mainly for distributional or social reasons. 
 
A diversionary or distributional component to regional policy is important, as without 
it, it is arguable whether what the Government calls ‘regional policy’ is really regional policy 
at all.  The regional problem is defined as persistent disparities in regional inequalities (Taylor 
and Wren, 1997), so that regional policy should attempt to reduce these disparities.  However, 
a Public Service Agreement target exists to “make sustainable improvements in the economic 
performance of all English regions and over the long term reduce the persistent gap in growth 
rates between the regions, defining measures to improve performance and reporting progress 
against these measures by 2006” (HM Treasury, 2003a).31  This merely seeks to reduce the 
differences in rates of regional growth, and, as Adams et al (2003) note, the gap in regional 
inequalities could widen and satisfy this target.  Without a strong redistributive component it 
can be argued that the current regional policy is really a regional development policy.  That is 
to say, it is a national policy, which is applied at the level of the region but to all regions.  In 
conclusion, we can note that three further factors add weight to this argument: 
  
i. The Government regional productivity paper makes no intention to favour the lagging 
regions (HM Treasury, 2001).  It objective is to improve the performance of every UK 
region in order to achieve high and stable levels of growth and employment; 
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ii. Regional Development Agencies exist in every English region, and these exploit the 
comparative advantage of their areas. Again, there is no presumption to favour lagging 
regions, and regional specialisation may favour the more prosperous parts; and 
 
iii. Under EU state aid rules regional grants provide the only opportunity to offer financial 
assistance to large projects.  In effect these grants are used to compete internationally 
for mobile projects, so that they benefit the national economy. 
 
6: Conclusions 
 
 The paper reviews the evidence on the effects and cost-effectiveness of regional grants 
in order to address the recent controversies surrounding UK regional policy.  It focuses on 
Regional Selective Assistance, and argues that the recent criticisms of this policy are largely 
misplaced.   It finds that the controversy over the employment effect of regional policy largely 
results from an unfavourable measure of the jobs, which is little used elsewhere.  While there 
are disputes about the value of the industrial survey approach used to evaluate regional policy, 
surrounding possible bias and the assumed nature of the regional labour market, it is argued 
that the policy is relatively cost-effective in employment terms, and that in the response to the 
question posed in the paper’s title, the grants are worth it.   
 
Other evidence on the effect of RSA in attracting FDI and on firm competitiveness is 
encouraging, but overall the policy effect is small in relation to the size of the unemployment 
problem, while spending on the grants seems likely to halve over the next few years, as recent 
changes take effect.  The paper argues for the reintroduction of a distributional component to 
regional policy in order to increase its scale, under which jobs created in the Assisted Areas 
are given a higher value than jobs created elsewhere, so that relocations within the UK are 
given value in the policymakers’ objective function.   As currently construed, regional grants 
serve mainly national economic objectives, including the attraction of inward investment to 
the UK as a whole, and there is little intention to favour the lagging regions.  As such, it is 
arguable whether what is currently called ‘regional policy’ is really regional policy at all, but 
rather a regional development policy that is pursued in all regions. 
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Notes 
 
1. The interest in regional issues can be gauged by the number of recent reports.  In addition 
to the above, they include a critique of regional policy (Regional Studies Association, 
2001), a Government position paper on regional policy vis-à-vis the European Union (HM 
Treasury, 2003a), a report on regional grants (NAO, 2003), a review of regional statistics 
(HM Treasury, 2004) and on-going reviews at the European Union level of the Structural 
Funds and state aids (see DTI, 2004).  The House of Commons Treasury Committee is also 
investigating the regional pattern of mainstream government expenditure. 
 
2. These are the Devolved Administrations, and in England the Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs), the London Development Agency and the proposed elected North-East 
Regional Assembly. 
 
3. In its lead story, the Financial Times newspaper interpreted this as placing “a question 
mark over the value of regional intervention” (17th June 2003). 
 
4. The Government sees its regional policy as boosting productivity, growth and employment 
through measures designed to generate or improve innovation, enterprise, skills and 
infrastructure (HM Treasury 2001).  Much of this is aimed at industry, and hence the term 
regional industrial policy is sometimes used.  The institutional reforms mean that much of 
this policy is now delivered at the regional level.  From April 2002 responsibility for RSA 
cases below £2 million in England was transferred to the RDAs.  Other regional aid 
schemes in Great Britain are mainly regeneration and property-related schemes (see DTI, 
2004, Annex 5).  In Northern Ireland there is a similar scheme to RSA, known as Selective 
Financial Assistance (see Harris and Trainor, 2005). 
 
5. Details of the schemes making up each category can be found below and in Wren (1996a). 
 
6. Prior to this time discretionary loans and grants amounted to no more than £5m in total at 
current prices. 
 
7. It was followed by a revised RDG scheme that related the grant amount to the number of 
jobs in projects backed by capital investment.  In turn it was superseded by the Regional 
Enterprise Grant scheme from 1988 to 1997 that restricted the assistance to small and 
innovative projects. 
 
8. At the time little was known about the operation of regional policy, although House of 
Commons reports pointed to excessive ‘grants per job’, which at current prices could be as 
high as £900,000 (see Wren, 1996a). 
 
9. Recently, the Government requires a market-failure rationale for each of its industrial 
support schemes.  However, while this implies efficiency (i.e. a position on the frontier) it 
does not necessarily imply social efficiency (i.e. location at the welfare optimum).    
 
10. The 1945 Distribution of Industry Act set the framework for regional policy in the 
immediate post-war period, but in fact was little used. 
 
11. Recent evidence on the achievement of job targets in RSA-assisted FDI is given in Jones 
and Wren (2004). 
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12. Changes made in the year 2000 to the first five conditions of Table 2 were that the project 
and firm must both be viable, a payback period of three years was required and a ‘National 
and Regional Benefit’ was sought, whereas previously it was a ‘Regional and National 
Benefit’. 
 
13. These are firms with up to 250 employees.  Similar schemes exist in Scotland and Wales. 
 
14. The designation of Assisted Areas is subject to European Community Guidelines and 
approval by the Commission.  The Assisted Areas are discussed in Armstrong (2001).  Tier 
1 areas have per capita GDP below 75% of the EU average, and are designated under 
Article 87 (3) (a) of the EC Treaty for Objective 1 support from the EU Structural Funds.  
Tier 2 areas are defined by the UK Government under Article 87 (3) (c) and capture ‘acute 
labour market need’.  In England the Government has designated Tier 3 areas for small 
business support under national assistance.  These are areas of ‘identified special need’, 
including areas of high unemployment, low employment, coalfield closure and rural areas.   
The aid map setting out the areas eligible for regional aid under Article 87 (3) (a) and (c) 
expires at the end of 2006, and the Commission is consulting with Member Stares on 
revised Regional Aid Guidelines (see CEC, 1998 and DTI, 2004). 
 
15. After the introduction of EGS, applications for RSA in England fell from 1,075 in 
1999/00 to 269 in 2000/01, and in Scotland from 348 to just 76.  Wales lagged these 
developments. 
 
16. For example, by full and part-time jobs, skilled and unskilled jobs, male and female 
employees, disadvantaged residents, ethnic minorities and so on. 
 
17. Other approaches are possible, so that Gillespie et al (2001) use a computable general 
equilibrium model to examine the economy-wide impacts of RSA in Scotland.   This is 
useful for taking into account the system-wide effects of assistance on output and input 
markets, including migration, but the results depend on how the labour market is specified.  
An alternative approach is a firm-based econometric approach, such as in Wren (1994), 
where a control group of non-assisted plants is used to determine the counter factual, but 
this can only really get at the direct effect. 
 
18. CBA is usually applied to appraise large infrastructure projects, rather than to evaluate 
programmes involving a large number of projects.  CEA offers guidance in a comparative 
sense, as it suggests a reallocation of resources where cost-effectiveness differs between 
employment policies or with other policies appropriately valued. 
 
19. ‘Additionality’ is not the same as the absence of a Type II error, as the latter makes no 
recognition of whether the assistance changes the nature of a project, whether in timing, 
scale or location, but merely whether the assistance amount was too much or not for the 
project that is actually implemented. 
 
20. NERA (2003) take the PJE estimate of RSA for England of 21,000 jobs, but express it at 
1995 values rather than 2002 values, and start with 17,000 PJEs.  They make an adjustment 
of 0.74 for strategic bias / ‘additionality’, and an adjustment of 0.44 for flexible labour 
markets, giving 17,000 jobs x 0.74 x 0.44 = 5,500 jobs.  No adjustment is made for job life. 
 
 22
21. That is, 84,000 jobs x 0.74 (for strategic bias / ‘additionality’) x 0.44 (for flexible labour 
markets) = 27,350 jobs. 
 
22. Taylor and Wren (1997) report that 90% of UK-owned firms offered RSA are SMEs. 
 
23. Similar estimates were obtained in the other Government-funded evaluation studies, at 
£15,800 over 1980-84 and £18,000 over 1985-88 (1995 prices). 
 
24. This is the New Deal for Young People, which is designed to prevent young people from 
entering long-term unemployment.  The gross Exchequer cost of the scheme was £350 
million by about the end of 2000.  It is estimated that claimant unemployment was reduced 
by about 50,000 by this time and that regular employment increased by half this number. 
The average cost of a person in employment from the New Deal is put at about £7,000, and 
the average cost of a person off the unemployment register is about half this amount. 
 
25. The employment effect for Great Britain is 652,000 PJYs, which is 212,300 PJYs when 
the NERA adjustments are made.  The mid-point is 430,000 PJYs, which implies a ‘cost 
per job’ of £1,600 (1995 prices). 
 
26. RSA created between 6,100 and 18,700 jobs a year in Great Britain as a whole, which is 
3,300 and 10,000 jobs per annum in England.  The mid-point is around 6,650 jobs, and 
hence 40,000 jobs over a six-year period. 
 
27. Typically, it is assumed that 75 per cent of new employment comes from the unemployed 
and the remainder from increased labour market participation (Gillespie et al, 2001). 
 
28. That is to say, it is not known how far the attempt to reduce or refuse a grant to projects 
that do not depend on assistance in order to improve cost-effectiveness has meant that too 
little has been offered or refused to projects that genuinely rely on assistance. 
 
29. The average grant rate on capital is 15 to 20 per cent, but the limits set by the European 
Commission permit grant rates of up to 40 per cent in the Tier 1 areas (and 55% for SMEs) 
and between 10 and 30 per cent in Tier 2 areas (with a 10% supplement for SMEs). 
 
30. The diversionary component can shift jobs to the Assisted Areas in two ways; either by 
relocating plants or by displacing jobs in the non-Assisted Areas.  When awarding grants 
the Government takes account of potential displacement effects, both inside and outside 
the Assisted Areas.  Allowing displacement to occur in non-Assisted Areas may potentially 
run counter to EU state aid rules, as it could be viewed as a distortion to competition, but a 
trade-off between efficiency for equity seems inevitable. 
 
31. It is the PSA Regional Economic Target for England, jointly agreed by the Department of 
Trade and Industry, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and HM Treasury. 
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Figure 1: Expenditure on Regional Industrial Assistance, 1960-02  
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 Source: Wren, C. (1996a) and Annual Reports on the 1982 Industrial Development Act. 
 
Notes: Figures are for actual grant payments at constant prices for Great Britain.  Data are for
financial years, so that 1960 refers to the financial year 1960-61 and so on.  24
Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investment Share of RSA 
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Source: Annual Reports on the 1982 Industrial Development Act. 
 
Note: The figure shows the percentage taken by foreign-owned plants of the total RSA-supported 
investment, the total RSA offered grant amount and the total number of RSA awards. 
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Table 1: The ‘Cost’ per Regional Policy ‘Job’ 
 
 
 
Manufacturing Gross Assistance Net Jobs ‘Cost per Job’ 
Industry Expenditure Created  
    
Capital-intensive £4,717 m 6,000 £786,000 
    
Labour-intensive £5,311 m 204,000 £26,000 
    
All industries £10,028 m 210,000 £47,750 
  
Source: Moore et al (1986) and Wren (2003a). 
 
Notes: Regional assistance expenditure over 1966-76 at 1982 prices.  Net jobs created 
include the direct and indirect jobs created over 1966-76 and existing at 1976.  Capital-
intensive industries are coal and petroleum, chemicals, mechanical engineering, metal 
manufacture, shipbuilding and marine engineering.  Labour-intensive industries are all 
other manufacturing industries. 
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Table 2: The Current Eligibility Criteria for RSA 
 
 
 
Jobs. Projects that create overcapacity, simply displace jobs elsewhere in the UK, or 
aim to relocate jobs from one part of the country to another, are not eligible. 
 
Viability: Businesses and projects should be viable, and the project will normally be 
expected to be profitable within three years. 
 
Other Funding. The greater part of the project cost should be funded from private-
sector sources. 
 
Proof of Need. Applicants must demonstrate that a grant is necessary to enable the 
project to proceed. 
 
National and Regional Benefit. All projects should contribute positive benefits to both 
the national and regional economies.  
 
Prior Commitment. Project appraisal must have been completed and a formal offer of 
assistance issued, before the applicant enters into a commitment to proceed with the 
project. 
 
Quality. Assistance is focused more on high-quality knowledge-based projects 
providing skilled jobs.  Four key factors are used to determine the quality of projects: 
wage levels, sustainable employment, R&D and training. 
 
Eligible Investment. The project must involve capital expenditure of more than 
£500,000 on fixed assets, such as property, plant or machinery. Expenditure can 
relate to expansion, modernising or the establishment of a new company. 
 
Source: HC 852 (2003). 
 
Note: The table does not include the claw-back condition or ex ante grant per job limit, 
which do not define eligibility 
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 Table 3: Regional Selective Assistance and Project ‘Additionality’ 
 
 
 
Response:  All periods 1991-95 1985-88 1980-84 
      
Gone Ahead Unchanged 18.5 19.3 15.1 22.1 
      
Gone Ahead, but:     
Later in time 23.8 24.0 29.2 16.8 
      
On a smaller scale 13.6 12.9 13.2 14.8 
      
Elsewhere outside UK 13.0 18.1 9.0 13.4 
      
Elsewhere inside UK 5.0 8.2 1.9 6.0 
      
Some combination 5.3 4.1 6.1 5.4 
      
Abandoned Altogether 20.8 13.5 25.5 21.5 
      
Number of sample firms 526 165 212 149 
 
Source: AEP (2000) and author’s own calculations. 
 
Notes: The table reports the percentage of firms in each category responding to a question 
on what would have occurred to the project in the absence of RSA, given the alternatives 
shown.  These are the interviewers’ assessments based on the responses given by senior 
personnel at the recipient firms. 
 
 
 
 
 28
Figure 3: ‘Additionality’ by Project Scale 
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Source: AEP (2000). 
 
Notes: Adapted from survey results of 165 RSA recipients over 1991-95.  It 
excludes the small number of cases where there is some combination of effects. 
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Table 4: Regional Policy Employment Effect, 1991-95 
 
 
 
 Employment effect ’Cost per job’ 
 Great Britain England AEP NERA 
     
Gross jobs created 210,000 111,000 £3,250 £10,000 
     
Less non-additional jobs (x 0.45):    
 94,000 50,000 - - 
Less displaced jobs (x 0.76):    
 71,500 38,000 - - 
Plus linkage and multiplier effects (x 1.18):   
     
Net jobs created 84,000 45,000 £8,150 £25,000 
     
Present value net job years (PJY) 652,000 351,000 £1,050 £3,250 
     
Permanent net job equivalents (PJE) 39,000 21,000 £17,500 £53,750 
 
Sources: AEP (2000) and NAO (2003). 
 
Notes: The first column is the estimated employment effect of RSA over the period 1991-95 from the 
AEP study, while that for England is an apportionment pro-rata to the expenditure on grants, based 
on the NAO report, which expresses the jobs at 2002 values.  The ‘costs per job’ are for net RSA 
expenditure at 1995 prices.  They are based on the AEP (2000) and NERA (2003) studies, where the 
latter makes adjustments for strategic bias (x 0.74) and flexible labour markets (x 0.44). 
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 Figure 4: Member State and EU Regional Assistance 
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 Source: DG Competition and DG Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels. 
 
Notes:  Direct financial support to firms in Objective 1 / Tier 1 Assisted Areas as a percentage of
GDP in these areas.  Annual averages for 1996-98. 31
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